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1 Introduction
A central authority in a vertically integrated company has by denition joint prot
maximization as its goal. That denition, however, says nothing on whether all deci-
sions in integrated companies should be taken at the central authority level. Actually,
it is widely recognized that some decisions should be delegated to a de-centralized au-
thority level. The theoretical underpinnings of this so-called delegation principle are
described in the industrial organization (IO) literature, where a principal may benet
from hiring an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize something other
than the welfare of the principal.1 These precommitment gains have been shown to
exist even if one allows for renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the
agent (Caillaud et al., 1995).
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is an integrated, global prot maximizing
company and as such it also faces the choice of delegating some authority to its sub-
sidiaries. Whether it does so or not depends on institutional and structural issues that
are specic to the MNE activity that we focus on. For example, for the case of R&D
activities, there exists a large literature that both documents and explains the extent
of de-centralization that takes place within MNEs.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on the degree of (de-)centralization
in MNEs by drawing attention to the importance of corporate tax di¤erences across
countries as determinants of MNEsdelegation decisions. The general implications of
such tax di¤erences are a central theme in the public nance literature on MNEs.3 It is
well known in that literature that a MNE uses transfer prices to shift prot to low tax
1See e.g. Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987), Fershtmann and Judd (1987), and Katz (1991).
2See e.g. Grandstrand et al. (1992), Almeida (1996), Papanastasiu and Pearce (2005) for empirical
evidence, and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002) for theoret-
ical considerations.
3The international taxation of MNEs is based on the so-called Separate Accounting tax system.
Under this system, each country can tax the prots of the rms that operate within its borders. This
requires that the MNE accounts for the prots that its entities make in each country of operation.
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jurisdictions.4. Our paper shows that the incentive to use transfer prices to save tax
payments can counteract the strategic delegation incentive, rendering the centralization
vs. de-centralization choice of a MNE a function of the tax di¤erential.
In presenting our argument as clearly as possible, we choose a simple model
where the absence of tax di¤erentials leads the MNE to delegate some authority to its
subsidiaries. While the subsidiaries are delegated the authority to choose output and
sales levels, the MNE centrally decides the (transfer) price a subsidiary will have to
pay for its input purchases. Assuming that the subsidiary operates in a market with
Cournot competition, such a decision structure will lead to a higher market share in
the subsidiarys market, and thus to higher joint prots. This is exactly the essence of
the delegation principle: by introducing a pre-commitment device (here, a low transfer
price), the centralized authority can induce the de-centralized authority to take global
prot maximizing actions.5
Tax di¤erentials, however, can alter the story: If the subsidiary faces su¢ ciently
higher taxes, then earning high (pre-tax) prots in that country due to a strategically
set low transfer price will not be prot-maximizing for the MNE anyway. A high and
not a low transfer price is needed to shift prots out of the high-tax country. But the
high transfer price inevitably interferes with the market share game of the subsidiary.
Consequently, a reconsideration of the delegation decision is called for, and possibly
the resolution is centralization in lieu of de-centralization.
In fact, it is straightforward to show that the outcome of the delegation decision
becomes an endogenous function of the tax di¤erential. In our example, small tax
di¤erentials lead to de-centralization, while large tax di¤erentials (with the subsidiary
taxed more heavily) will lead to centralization.
We recognize that the issue that we describe above arises due to the fact that
there is one instrument (the transfer price) addressing two targets (minimizing tax
4Weichenrieder (1996) studies European multinationals and their transfer pricing behavior, and
Hines (1999) surveys the literature on U.S. multinational behavior.
5Our product market competition set-up resemples that of Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002),
who also compare the centralized and de-centralized prots in a model with R&D choices.
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payments and providing a strategic advantage to the subsidiary). A solution may be
to introduce an instrument other than the transfer price, e.g. a monetary incentive
to the manager of the subsidiary rm, and assign each instrument to a particular
target. While such a procedure could be possible, it does not eliminate the fact that
transfer prices do have multiple and sometimes conicting roles. Our choice of model
is motivated exactly by our desire to bring out this conict and relate it to the MNEs
de-centralization decision.
There exists some relevant literature on the e¤ect of taxes on a MNEs setting
of transfer prices. Mintz and Elizur (1996) model the transfer price as a tax-minimizing
instrument and as an instrument to inuence the decisions of a self-maximizing manager
in the subsidiary company. However, by imposing a transfer pricing rule, i.e. by xing
the transfer price to a level acceptable to the tax authorities, they focus mostly on the
second attribute of transfer prices and how tax competition a¤ects the MNE. More
closely related papers are Schjelderup and Sørgaard (1997) and Zhao (2000), where
the transfer price takes on the same dual role as in this paper, i.e. both as a strategic
device and as a tax-minimizing instrument. However, in both papers delegation is
taken as given and is not a matter of choice. In a related paper, Nielsen et al. (2003),
we also assume delegation, but point out the possibility that delegation may not be
prot maximizing when tax di¤erences are large. In the present paper we examine this
particular issue in detail.
2 The model
Consider a MNE that operates in two countries: country A, where the parent rm is
located, and country B, where the subsidiary rm is located. The parent produces a
product that is sold directly to the consumers in country A, and is also sold to the
consumers in country B through the subsidiary rm, which here takes the form of a
retailer. The market in country A is assumed to be monopolistic, while the market
in country B is characterized by Cournot competition between the subsidiary and a
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local rm.6 To simplify but without impact on the qualitative insight of our results, we
assume that demand in both countries is linear and all production costs are constant
and normalized to zero. Based on these assumptions the rmsprots (absent taxes)
are the following:7
A = (1 QA)QA + qQB (1)
B = (1 QB  QB)QB   qQB (2)
B

= (1 QB  QB)QB (3)
The quantity sold in country i (i = A;B) is denoted by Qi, while an asterisk () denotes
variables for the local competitor in country B. The transfer price is denoted by q. As
is seen, the parent rm has revenues from selling directly to country As consumers
and to the subsidiary in country B (while the costs of producing QA and QB are zero
by assumption). The subsidiarys revenue depends on the sales of the local competitor,
while its costs are determined by the transfer price which it has to pay to the parent
rm. Finally, the foreign local rm has revenues from selling in its local market (while
the costs of producing QB are zero).
Accounting for taxes, the MNE maximizes after-tax global prots, while the
local competitor maximizes its after-tax local prots B

. In each country there is
a company tax (tA; tB) that falls on the prots of the rms that operate within the
country, i.e. taxation is based on the separate accounting system.8 It is also assumed
that in the case where the transfer price deviates from its true (arms length) value of
zero, the MNE faces a non-tax-deductable transfer pricing cost.9 We assume that this
cost is quadratic and based on the actual di¤erence between the chosen price and the
6This set-up is the simplest possible to portray the strategic considerations involved in setting
transfer prices. None of the qualitative results that we present here depends on the Cournot assumption
(except for the sign of the transfer price under de-centralization).
7Since for our purpose there is no need for general intercept and slope parameters in demand
expressions, we take all of them to be unity.
8In addition, we assume that the exemption principle of international taxation is in force, so that the
subsidiarys income is not liable to tax in the parents country. In essence, this requires the subsidiary
to be a separate legal entity.
9These costs can be thought of as real resource costs that the MNE pays to experts (lawyers,
5
true price (which is zero here), viz. q2=2:10 That is, if the transfer price is not zero, the
MNE incurs costs that are an increasing function of the deviation from zero.11
We proceed by examining, in turn, a centralized and a de-centralized decision
structure of the MNE. The option of centralization implies that the MNE chooses
both its transfer price, output and sales simultaneously (subsection 2.1). We derive
the endogenous variables and nd the centralized MNEs prots as a function of tax
rates tA and tB. We then examine the de-centralization option (subsection 2.2), where
the MNE chooses centrally only its transfer price, while its entities choose output and
sales decentrally. Again we derive the endogenous variables and nd the de-centralized
prots as functions of tA and tB. We then compare the MNEs prots in the two
equilibria (subsection 2.3) and determine the e¤ect of the tax di¤erential on the MNEs
organizational structure, viz. centralization or de-centralization.
2.1 Centralized choices
This is the case where the MNE chooses centrally all its decision variables in order
to maximize after-tax global prots (C , where superscript C denotes centralized). In
doing so, the MNE takes into account the Cournot competition in country B and the
cost of transfer-price distortion. The maximization problems of the centralized MNE
accountants) in order to argue to authorities for the particular level of the transfer price chosen. One
can also perceive these costs as an expected penalty that tax authorities impose on distorted transfer
pricing.
10Including a convex transfer price is necessary in order to obtain an internal solution for the transfer
price (see Kant, 1988, and Hauer and Schjelderup, 2000).
11One might argue that transfer pricing costs/penalties should depend not only on the extent of
transfer pricing distortion, i.e. the di¤erence between q and 0, but also on the volume of the intra-rm
transactions QB and/or on the actual tax rates ti. The implications of di¤erent transfer price penalty
schemes are an interesting topic in itself that has only rarely been touched upon; see Nielsen et al.
(2004). Here, however, alternative formulations of the cost/penalty scheme have no qualitative e¤ect
on the issue which we examine. Thus, we choose to proceed with the simple quadratic transfer pricing
cost function.
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and its competitor in country B are:
max
q;QA;QB
C = (1  tA)A + (1  tB)B   1
2
q2
max
QB
B

= (1  tB)B
Deriving the rst order conditions we get:12
q : q = (tB   tA)QB (4)
QA : QA =
1
2
(5)
QB : (tB   tA)q + (1  tB)(1  2QB  QB) = 0 (6)
QB : Q

B =
1 QB
2
(7)
Substituting (4) into (6) we derive:
(tB   tA)2QB + (1  tB)(1  2QB  QB) = 0; (8)
which we then solve together with (7) to derive the equilibrium values for the Cournot
quantities and the transfer price:
QB =
1  tB
3(1  tB)  2(tB   tA)2 (9)
QB =
(1  tB)  (tB   tA)2
3(1  tB)  2(tB   tA)2 (10)
q =
(1  tB)(tB   tA)
3(1  tB)  2(tB   tA)2 (11)
It is immediately seen that in the case where the tax rates are equal in the
two countries (tA = tB), the choice variables take on the anticipated values, i.e. the
transfer price will be set equal to the true price (q = 0) and QB = QB =
1
3
, the
standard expressions for Cournot duopoly quantities.13 However, when tA 6= tB; the
tax-manipulation incentive enters. Starting from equal tax levels we can show that
12From (5) we see that the sales in country A are independent of taxes and transfer prices. This is
due to the assumption of constant marginal costs which e¤ectively separates the two sales decisions.
13The intuition behind setting q = 0 is easy to grasp when one notices that the parent rm avoids
double marginalization issues by charging the retailer a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost of
production.
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dQB
dtB

tA=tB
< 0 and dq
dtB

tA=tB
> 0; i.e. when taxes become higher in the foreign country
(B), then the MNE will reduce sales in that country by overinvoicing in the internal
transaction.
Evaluating total centralized prots C = (1   tA)A + (1   tB)B   12q2 at
the equilibrium choices QA; QB; q gives:
C =
(1  tA)
4
+
(1  tB)2

2(1  tB)  (tB   tA)2

2

3(1  tB)  2 (tB   tA)2
2 (12)
For tA = tB = t, we get
C = (1  t)(1
4
+
1
9
): (13)
2.2 De-centralized choices
We now consider the case where the MNE chooses its transfer price centrally, but
decentralizes production and sales decisions to its entities. In order to depict the benets
from pre-commitment, we rst consider production and sales decisions given a xed
transfer price.
From the maximization problems maxQA 
A;maxQB 
B;maxQB 
B, where
the prots are dened in (1)-(3), we derive the following equilibrium sales choices:
QA =
1
2
(14)
QB =
1  2q
3
(15)
QB =
1 + q
3
(16)
which are the standard monopoly, respectively Cournot duopoly sales choices.
However, the transfer price q is determined centrally by the (headquarters of
the) MNE which can behave strategically. Maximizing DC = (1 tA)A+(1 tB)B 
1
2
q2 with respect to q, we derive:
q =
4tB   3tA   1
13 + 8tB   12tA (17)
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In the absence of tax di¤erentials tA = tB = t, the above becomes:
q =
t  1
13  4t < 0
that is, the strategic delegation e¤ect alone leads to underinvocing. This is exactly what
we should expect in our Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium.14 Setting a low transfer price
makes the subsidiary sell a larger quantity. The competitor anticipates this and its best
response is to limit its own sales.15
We now move on to calculate the de-centralized prots DC . Using (1), (2),
(14), (15) and (17), gives:
DC =
1  tA
4
+
1  tB
9
+
(4tB   3tA   1)2
18 (13 + 8tB   12tA) (18)
For tB = tA = t the above expression reads
DC = (1  t)

1
4
+
1
9

+
(t  1)2
18(13  4t) (19)
In what follows we compare the MNEs (after-tax) prots under centralization
and de-centralization, stressing the intuition for our results.
2.3 Comparing centralized and de-centralized prots
For equal taxes, and by comparing (13) and (19), it is straightforward to see that
de-centralized global prots are always higher than centralized prots. In particular,
DC   C = (t 1)2
18(13 4t) > 0 for t 2 (0; 1). This is exactly as expected: without any tax
14This strategic delegation e¤ect is absent in the centralized equilibrium. Due to it, we expect the
de-centralized transfer price to generally be lower than the centralized transfer price, even in the face of
tax di¤erences. For realistic tax levels, i.e. 0  ti < 1; our simulations indeed conrm this conjecture;
see gure 2 below.
15By observing the low transfer price the local competitior anticipates the subsidiarys production
decision and, thus, reduces its own quantity. Observability of the transfer price may seem like a strong
assumption. However import prices, for example, are public information in many countries due to
the calculation of duties and tari¤s. Furthermore, the MNE has an incentive to make this type of
information publicly available. Katz (1991) discusses observability issues in delegation.
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saving incentive, pre-commitment to a low transfer price provides a credible incentive
to expand sales in the subsidiarys market, and thus win the market-share game in that
country. Thus, de-centralized decisions are more protable than centralized decisions
in the absence of tax di¤erences.16
However, for unequal taxes, the result of the comparison becomes ambiguous
and a function of the specic tax levels in the two countries. The incentive to save tax
payments works against the strategic e¤ect of transfer prices, in which case it is not
obvious that the rm should make use of its delegation opportunity. A simple numerical
example is su¢ cient for illustrating and providing the main intuition.
Setting tB = 0:3 in (12) and (18) and allowing tA (t in the gure) to vary, we
obtain the following picture:17
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
Profit
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6tax
Figure 1: Centralized vs. de-centralized prots
The bold/red curve depicts the de-centralized prots, while the thin/green
16Clearly, this result rests on the fact that there is oligopolistic competition in the foreign country.
Altering the competition assumption can certainly eliminate the result, making centralized decisions
at least as protable as de-centralized decisions.
17We depict the prot curves only up to tA = 0:6, as after that level of taxes negative equilibrium
quantities appear.
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curve depicts the centralized prots. The two prot functions are equal at tA ' 0:208:
For tA < tA, centralized prots are higher than de-centralized prots, while the opposite
holds for tA > tA:
Performing a similar exercise for the transfer price functions (11) and (17), we
get the following picture:
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
(q)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6t
Figure 2: Centralized vs. de-centralized transfer prices
As expected the de-centralized transfer price (bold/red curve - y-axis) is always
below the centralized transfer price (thin/green curve) (see footnote 14).
To explain what is happening in the Figures, note rst that, as discussed above,
equal taxes entail that the MNE always chooses a de-centralized decision structure.
However, if the tax in the subsidiarys home country is higher than the tax in the
parents country, i.e. tB = 0:3 > tA, the MNE will want to underinvoice in order to
save tax payments abroad. Thus, the tax saving incentive dictates a high transfer price,
while the strategic delegation e¤ect favors a low transfer price. As tA falls, the desire to
save tax payments strengthens; unfortunately, doing so interferes with the market-share
game that the subsidiary is involved in. The result is that at some point it becomes
unprotable to use the transfer price as an instrument to implement de-centralized
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decisions. In our example, this point is reached at tA ' 0:208: Below this tax level it is
more protable for the MNE to exclusively focus on saving tax payments, and the way
to accomplish this is to eliminate the de-centralization option and instead choose sales
in a centralized manner. In a sense, the problem of the conicting roles of the transfer
price is resolved by moving all decisions to the central level.
Having explained the intuition for the case of a Cournot duopoly, we can now
briey address the e¤ects of alternative assumptions. First note that if the duopoly in
the foreign country was characterized by Bertand competition and di¤erentiated prod-
ucts, then the MNE would have an incentive to set a high transfer price. The intuition
is that the Bertrand competition is too intense to start with, and a high transfer price
enables a higher price for the subsidiarys product (as well as that of the competitor).18
A high transfer price will not interfere with the tax saving incentive as long as the tax
in the foreign country is higher than the tax in the parents country. When tB > tA,
the two concerns of the MNE are not in conict with each other, and de-centralization
is clearly to be preferred. The conict, however, will arise if tB < tA, where tax sav-
ing demands a low transfer price and strategic delegation (under Betrand competition
with di¤erentiated products) requires a high transfer price. Beyond a certain critical
value of the tax di¤erential, centralized decisions will become more protable than
de-centralised decisions. A gure similar to gure 1 can still be drawn for this case. It
will feature a prots curve for de-centralization which will lie above the prots curve
for centralization for all values of tA to the left of some intersection point at a value
tA, which itself lies to the right of tB = 0:3.
The number of competitors in the foreign market also has an intuitive e¤ect on
our results. Assuming a larger and xed number of rms in country B, or a free entry
and exit Cournot game, will reduce the prots that strategic delegation can provide to
the MNEs subsidiary. Reducing theses prots weakens the strategic delegation incen-
tive, making it less worthwhile to use transfer prices for that purpose. Centralization,
allowing clear focus on tax manipulation, will be more protable than de-centralization,
18If the two companiesproducts were homogeneous and they competed in Bertrand fashion, then
the strategic motive for setting the transfer price would vanish.
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even for small tax di¤erentials.19
To sum up, de-centralization allows the MNE to aggressively pursue com-
petition in the subsidiarys market, but only halfheartedly manipulate its tax pay-
ments. Centralization allows full devotion to tax manipulation, but no strategic pre-
commitment in the subsidiarys market. The size of tax di¤erentials determines how
important pursuing a tax saving strategy is and therefore the most appropriate decision
structure of the MNE.
3 Conclusions
AMNEs choice of organization of its decision making is complex and depends on a host
of considerations. The theoretical guidelines on this issue are laid out in the principal-
agent theory of the rm, where it is widely recognized that de-centralization of decision-
making o¤ers a number of advantages to the rm (the precommitment/delegation
argument). In this paper we focus on this de-centralization choice, but in addition
we underline an issue, namely national tax di¤erentials, which is specic to MNEs as
they operate in di¤erent tax jurisdictions.
We argue that tax di¤erentials have an important bearing on whether a MNE
chooses to make all its decisions at the central level or not. By emphasizing the cen-
tralization vs. de-centralization decision as a choice that the MNE must make in its
e¤orts to maximize prots, we have shown that while small tax di¤erentials favor de-
centralized decisions, large tax di¤erentials may render centralized decisions preferable.
In modeling this issue, we choose to focus on the conicting roles that transfer prices
can have within a MNE, and on how centralizing decision-making can help overcome
these problems.
An important assumption in our analysis is that the transfer price addresses
two targets (minimizing tax payments and providing a strategic advantage to the sub-
19Similar intuition can be applied to the case of assymetric production costs. Further, the importance
of the strategic transfer price motive and thus the precise break-even point between centralization and
de-centralization obviously hinges on the exact demand conditions in country B.
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sidiary). At the face of it one might think that one solution could be to introduce an
instrument other than the transfer price, e.g. a monetary incentive to the manager of
the subsidiary rm, and assign each instrument to a particular target. Alternatively,
two transfer prices could address the tax saving and the strategic incentive separately.
We would, however, like to stress that neither of these two suggested schemes would
eliminate the problem at hand namely that any transfer price set-up has two conicting
roles. To understand why, consider the case where the parent rm exports goods to
its foreign subsidiary at a (transfer) price, using the transfer price as a strategic pre-
commitment device. At the same time the parent charges the subsidiary an overhead
charge and this takes on the role of shifting prot to the low tax country. Such a scheme
is in violation with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, which state that any transfer
(cost or income) must reect real activity between the parties.20 Thus, the size of the
overhead charge must be related to the size of export (i.e. real activity between the
two parties). E¤ectively then the same problem arises as in the case of a single transfer
price. This is the legal tax reason for why the transfer pricing problem in essence can
be compounded into a single transfer price transaction, where the transfer price must
deal with conicting incentives.
Finally, whether or not MNEs in reality change their organizational structure
in response to tax di¤erentials is an empirical issue that is certainly worth pursuing. Our
theoretical arguments (albeit based on a number of assumptions) entail that MNEs may
be less likely to delegate decision-making to subsidiaries which are located in countries
with either very high or very low tax rates, depending on the nature of competition for
local market shares. It would be interesting to see whether this tendency can be found
in the data.
20OECD 1979/1985.
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